This paper investigates several approaches to equilibrium selection and the relationships between them. The class of games we study are n-person generalized coordination games with multiple Pareto rankable strict Nash equilibria. The main result is that all selection criteria select the same outcome (namely the risk dominant equilibrium) in two-person games, and that most equivalences break for games with more than two players. All criteria select the Pareto efficient equilibrium in voting games, of which pure coordination games are special cases. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D82.
INTRODUCTION
Multiple equilibria are common in economic models. As an example, consider the stag hunt game. There are n identical players who must choose simultaneously between two actions, H and L. The safe strategy L yields a fixed payoff x ∈ (0, 1). The strategy H yields the higher payoff of 1 if at least κ players choose the same action H , but it yields nothing otherwise. For example, the median rule takes κ to be the smallest integer larger than n/2, while the minimum rule takes κ = n. These games have two strict Nash equilibria in pure strategies, namely, H (all players choose H ) and L (all choose L). Which equilibrium should be selected has provoked much debate.
One might argue that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium H is the focal point, but recent experimental results by van Huyck et al. (1990 van Huyck et al. ( , 1991 show that subjects frequently fail to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. One can also question whether H is always the intuitively most appealing solution. For instance, action L is less risky especially when x and κ are large. Harsanyi and Selten's (1988; HS henceforth) notion of risk dominance captures this idea in two-person games. They claim that in these games, L is risk dominant if and only if x > 1 2 . Another approach is Carlsson and van Damme's (1993a;  CvD henceforth) global perturbations approach. This derives a selection rule by perturbing the original game with uncertainty about the players' information structure and embedding it in a game of incomplete information. In two-by-two games, CvD show that the selection based on global perturbations coincides with HS's risk dominance.
Another strand of literature addressed the selection problem by explicitly incorporating dynamic and evolutionary processes. Matsui and Matsuyama (1995;  MM henceforth) study perfect foresight deterministic dynamics in which players discount the future and the opportunity to revise their strategies arrives randomly. MM show that, if players are sufficiently patient, or if each player can revise his strategy almost at will, a version of dynamic stability leads to the risk dominant equilibrium. The best response dynamics, which are obtained in the limit as players become myopic, do not readily distinguish between the two strict Nash equilibria since both equilibria are asymptotically stable. Young (1993) and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993; KMR henceforth) have resolved this indeterminacy problem by introducing small random mutations at the individual player level, thus making the dynamic process stochastic. Foster and Young (1990; FY henceforth) and Fudenberg and Harris (1992) directly analyze stochastic replicator dynamics in which the process by which relative payoffs are translated into strategy adjustments is subject to continual perturbations. Noise causes play to shift perpetually from the neighborhood of one equilibrium to another. Long run equilibria are defined to be the states which appear with nonvanishing probability in the limit as the amount of noise vanishes. Each of these evolutionary models yields its cleanest prediction, namely the risk-dominant equilibrium, in 2 × 2 coordination games. 1 This paper explores games with more than two players. Specifically, we focus on n-person binary action coordination games with two strict Pareto-ranked Nash 1 There are several dynamic models in which the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is selected. Aumann and Sorin (1989) consider reputation effects in the repeated play of two-player games of common interests (i.e., games where there is a payoff vector that strongly Pareto dominates all other feasible payoffs). They show that when the possible types are all pure strategies with bounded recall then reputation effects pick out the Pareto-dominant outcome. Matsui (1991) considers a large population randomly matched to play a game of common interest with cheap talk. He shows that a unique cyclically stable set exists and contains only Pareto-dominant outcome. These works are excluded from our analysis, since we are concerned with the situation in which a large population anonymously play coordination games without communication.
equilibria. Generalization to multiperson games is also motivated by recent experimental results of van Huyck et al. (1990 van Huyck et al. ( , 1991 , which suggest that group size is important in determining the long run coordination outcome. The purpose of this paper is to study several approaches to equilibrium selection, to characterize fully the selection rules, and to expose the relationship among them. In particular, we study the following five models: three models of dynamic/evolutionary processes (MM, KMR, and FY) and two most salient selection models (HS and CvD).
The main result is that all selection criteria select the same outcome in twoperson games and that predictions differ from each other in the games with more than two players. We provide geometric interpretations to clarify why the criteria are equivalent for two-person games but not for more general games. The idea behind our results can be understood as follows: in KMR or Young, the long run equilibrium depends only on the relative sizes of the strict equilibria's basins of attraction and not on the speed of adjustment in each basin. On the other hand, evaluation of some weighted integrals of the payoff difference function is central to characterizing the dynamic outcomes in MM, FY, and Fudenberg and Harris. All selection criteria coincide when the payoff difference function, or relative fitness, is linear in the state variable, which is the case only with a two-person game. In particular, the selected outcome in a two-person game coincides with the risk-dominant equilibrium. There is no guarantee of equivalence otherwise. As a counterexample, we later characterize the selection criteria of different approaches, in the stag hunt game described in the opening paragraph.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the game of interest. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium selection criteria applying the MM, KMR, and FY dynamics. Section 4 investigates the most salient static selection criteria, namely HS's risk dominance and CvD's global perturbation. Section 5 compares these criteria, provides geometric interpretations, and proposes concrete answers to stag hunt games. Section 6 shows that all dynamic selection criteria studied in this paper support Pareto-dominance in voting games, of which pure coordination games are special cases. The final section concludes with some comments.
THE GAME
We consider a symmetric coordination game G(n, ), where n is the number of players and is the payoff matrix. Each player has binary choices available, denoted by high (H) and low (L). Consider a situation in which (k −1) opponents choose H with the remaining (n − k) opponents choosing L. Let π H k and π L n−k+1 , where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, denote the payoff for a player taking H and L, respectively, where subscripts denote the total numbers of players choosing the strategy in superscripts. The class of games being studied is described by the space of payoff matrices as
where 2n is the 2n-dimensional Euclidean space. The first set of inequalities in Eq. (1) imply that a player taking a particular action is no worse off when the number of opponents taking the same action increases. The next two inequalities require that all players playing a common action constitutes a strict Nash equilibrium. The last inequality means that the equilibrium when all players play H, denoted by H, is better than the one when all players play L, denoted by L. The following preliminary result is straightforward. LEMMA 1. If ∈ then the only pure strategy equilibria of G(n, ) are the two strict Nash equilibria, viz. H and L.
All the proofs are set out in the Appendix.
DYNAMIC SELECTIONS
We deal with three types of dynamic processes, namely MM, KMR, and FY in turn, to calculate equilibrium selection rules in the game G(n, ). To that end, we illustrate the general features and definitions common to all three dynamic processes. Time runs from t = 0 to ∞. The game G(n, ) is played repeatedly in a society with N identical players. The population size N may be finite or infinite, and N is divisible by n if finite. At every point in time, each player is matched to form a group with the other (n − 1) players, who are randomly drawn from the population playing the game anonymously. There is inertia in the sense that not every player is able to change his strategy at will. Given the chance to switch actions, players choose a best response with respect to some suitably defined objective function. Because of anonymity, they engage in this optimization without taking into account strategic considerations such as reputation, punishment, and forward induction.
Let y t denote the fraction of the players that are committed to action H at time t, where the state space is Y ⊆ [0, 1]. Given the state y, let H (y) and L (y) denote the value of playing action H and L, respectively. We derive the payoff difference function, N (y), using the following definitions of coefficient
If N is infinite,
Then the payoff difference function is expressed as
is increasing in k. We suppress the subscript N or ∞ in whenever there is no confusion.
Matsui and Matsuyama
We begin with the MM dynamics. Time is continuous. The population is a continuum, i.e., N = ∞, so the state space is Y = [0, 1]. If we make N finite, we still obtain a similar result. The key assumption is that not every player can switch actions at will. More specifically, we assume that the opportunity to switch actions arrives randomly, following a Poisson process with parameter λ, the mean arrival rate. It is further assumed that this process is independent across the players and that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Due to the costly adjustment assumption, the social behavior pattern y t changes continuously over time with its rate of change belonging to [−λy t , λ(1 − y t )]. Furthermore, any 2 Let z denote the number of players choosing action H. To avoid unnecessary complications, we may assume the case where n ≤ z < N − n. The formula for γ k (y | N ) is derived simply by changing variable y = z/N , from
feasible path necessarily satisfies y 0 e −λt ≤ y t ≤ 1 − (1 − y 0 )e −λt , where the initial condition y 0 is given exogenously.
When the opportunity to switch arrives, players choose the action which results in the higher expected discounted payoffs, recognizing the future path of y as well as their own inability to switch actions continuously. Given the opportunity, players commit to play H if V t > 0, L if V t < 0 and are indifferent if V t = 0, where
with r > 0 being the discount rate. We define ρ ≡ r /λ to be the effective discount rate or the degree of friction. Therefore, {y t } t∈ [0,∞) is an equilibrium path from y 0 if its right-hand derivative exists and satisfieṡ
for any t. This states that all players currently playing action H (respectively L) switch, if given the chance, to L (resp. H), when V t < (resp. >) 0. MM specify the stability concept as follows. A state y is called accessible from y , if an equilibrium path from y that reaches or converges to y exists. It is called globally accessible if it is accessible from any y ∈ [0, 1]. A state y is called absorbing 3 if a neighborhood U of y exists such that any equilibrium path from U converges to y. It is fragile if not absorbing. 4 To state the properties of the state y = 0 and y = 1, let us define the partition ( 0 (n, ρ), 1 (n, ρ), 01 (n, ρ)) of the set . For this purpose, let α denote an n-dimensional vector whose kth element is α k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and the vector β is similarly defined. Also, let "·" denote the inner product of two vectors. For
We derive Lemma 2, using the definitions of sets,
where
Lemma 4 in the Appendix provides the properties of the coefficient vector α(n, ρ) and β(n, ρ). We suppress (n, ρ) in defining the partitioned set whenever there is no confusion.
LEMMA 2. The state y is globally accessible iff ∈ y for either y = 0 or y = 1; both y = 1 and y = 0 are absorbing iff ∈ 01 . Lemma 2 states that, for a given ρ, if the payoff matrix lies in the region 0 (n, ρ), then y = 0 is absorbing. It also implies that there are either one or two absorbing states and that a state is uniquely absorbing if and only if it is globally accessible. In summary, for any initial behavior patterns, there is an equilibrium path that converges to the state of everyone choosing L, and, if a sufficiently large fraction of population choose L initially, any equilibrium path converges to that state. Similarly, for a given ρ, if the payoff matrix is in the region 1 (n, ρ), then y = 1 is absorbing. If the payoff matrix lies in the region 01 (n, ρ), on the other hand, both states are absorbing. Proposition 1(a) states that, as friction vanishes, one state becomes fragile and the other becomes globally accessible. The regions 0 and 1 shrink as friction grows and, in the limit as friction goes to infinity, disappear. Proposition 1(b) states that, in the presence of large friction, both states become absorbing.
, where the weights are defined by
there exists > 0 such that y = 1 is uniquely absorbing and globally accessible for any ρ ∈ (0, ). If the inequality is reversed, the same statement holds with y = 0. In the nongeneric case of equality, both y = 0 and y = 1 are absorbing for any ρ > 0.
(b) For any ∈ , there exists η > 0 such that both y = 0 and y = 1 are absorbing and no state is globally accessible for any ρ > η.
Recall that the smaller (larger) size of ρ implies more (less) patience and/or a shorter (longer) duration of an action commitment. 5 The smaller the degree of friction, ρ, gets, the more the long run equilibrium tends to rely on the payoff matrix specification and the less on the initial position of strategic uncertainty, and vice versa. 6 On the other extreme case of ρ approaching infinity, called the best response dynamics, both states may obtain in the long run and exactly which one would come out depends solely upon what the initial state was. In fact, the dynamic paths would be close to those studied in Gilboa and Matsui (1991) .
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
Next we study the KMR dynamic with n ≥ 2 players matching. Time is discrete, but Kandori (1991) verifies that the results derived by KMR are robust when extended to a continuous time formulation. Population size N is finite, and the state space is Y = {0, 1/N , . . . , 1 − 1/N , 1}. Within period t, there are a large number of random matches among the players so that each player's average payoff in that period is equal to the expected payoff.
Consider the MM dynamics in which players become myopic. Together with the inertia assumption, this implies that, given the chance to move, each player adopts a best response against the current strategy configuration of the society as a whole. In other words, players commit to action H if (y t ) > 0, and to action L if (y t ) < 0. A deterministic Darwinian dynamic y t+1 = f (y t ) is then defined by sign( f (y) − y) = sign( (y)) for 0 < y < 1.
Since the game G(n, ) has two strict Nash equilibria, the Darwinian dynamic possesses multiple steady states and that the asymptotic behavior of the system depends on the initial condition y 0 . Indeterminacy is resolved if we perturb the system with a constant flow of mutations. For a fixed ε, we may define a stochastic dynamic by composing the deterministic dynamic f with a random mutation under which each player's strategy at time t + 1 is altered to the other action with probability ε. The stochastic model is described by a Markov process. Since ε is strictly positive, the transition matrix is irreducible and, hence, the Markov concerned about the future. That λ → ∞ might have two opposite effects: players are less concerned about the future whilst the current strategy distribution becomes less important. Nevertheless, a strictly positive r guarantees that the second effect always dominates the first one. Therefore, the smaller ρ gets, the more players worry about the future. 6 We have assumed that the speed of adjustment, represented by Poisson arrival parameter λ, is identical over the whole population. This does not seem a severe restriction since we have studied symmetric games. Nevertheless, we can in principle incorporate asymmetric speed of adjustment into the game of interest G(n, ) by assuming that each population i has a Poisson arrival rate λ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. A fair amount of numerical simulations indicate that the equilibrium criterion depends on these numbers. However, a strong result can be obtained in any-symmetric or not-2 × 2 games, which states: "If and only if action H is risk dominant with respect to L (in the sense of larger Nash product), then H is uniquely absorbing and globally accessible for sufficiently small ρ i for i = 1, 2, with ρ 1 /ρ 2 = δ fixed." A proof is available upon request.
process has the unique steady state distribution which indicates the proportion of time that the system spends on each state in Y . A strategy configuration y ∈ Y is defined as a long run equilibrium (LRE) if, as ε → 0, the limit distribution assigns positive probability on y. KMR show that the LRE corresponds to the risk dominant equilibrium in two-by-two games.
The following proposition states the selection criterion for n-person generalized coordination game G(n, ). Since the game G(n, ) has two strict equilibria, and the relative sizes of basins of attractions determine the LRE, it matters whether or not the payoff difference function (y) cuts the horizontal axis at a point less than a half. The following proposition generalizes existing results on two-person games (KMR's Theorems 3 and 4 and Young's Theorem 3) to multiperson games.
where the weights are defined by
there exists an N such that the unique LRE is y = 1 for any N > N. If the inequality is reversed, the LRE becomes y = 0. In the nongeneric case of equality, the LRE can be either y = 1 and y = 0, with the limit distribution placing probability half on each.
Foster and Young
The last dynamic we study is Foster and Young (1990) , which is acknowledged to be the first to consider a stochastic differential equation model of evolutionary dynamics. Time is continuous, and the population size N = ∞. Given the state y t , the current rate of increase for H is H (y), while the average rate of increase of the whole population is y
, where H and L are the value of playing action H and L, respectively. The relative rate of increase in the fraction of H is given by the deterministic replicator equation
where the payoff difference function is defined in Eq. (2). Equation (8) can be written as
This system has two asymptotically stable states, namely y = 0 and y = 1, and exactly which one is obtained depends completely on the initial state y 0 . FY resolve this indeterminacy problem by perturbing the deterministic system with continual and nonnegligible shocks. We then obtain the following stochastic differential equation
where W t is a Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance. To keep the state y always positive, the state space must be Y = [ , 1 − ] for some small > 0.
7
Our goal is to study the asymptotic behavior of Eq. (10) as σ converges to zero. The state y ∈ Y is called a stochastically stable equilibrium (SSE in short) if, as σ → 0, the limiting density assigns positive probability to every small neighborhood of y. Theorem 2 of FY shows that computation of the SSE can be done by finding the minimum of a suitably defined potential function. The potential function U (y) can be explicitly computed from the formula Eq. (5) of FY as
Combining all the arguments implies that the problem is to find y ∈ [0, 1] minimizing U (y). The following proposition provides the selection criterion according to the SSE notion.
then y = 1 is the unique SSE. If the inequality is reversed, y = 0 is the unique SSE. In the nongeneric case of equality, the SSE can be either y = 0 or y = 1, with the limit distribution placing probability half on each.
STATIC SELECTIONS

Global Perturbation
The global perturbation approach of Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) is based on a perturbation of the players' payoff information in 2 × 2 games. The game to be played is determined by a random draw from some subclass of all 2 × 2 games. Each player observes the selected game with some noise and then chooses one of his two available actions. If the initial subclass of games is large enough and contains games with different equilibrium structures, iterative elimination of dominated strategies in the incomplete information game yields a surprising result. When the 2 × 2 game actually selected by Nature is a coordination game, iterated dominance forces the players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium, if the amount of noise in the players' observations is sufficiently small. Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) consider a class of n-person binary choice games that are described in the Introduction of this paper. They analyze the global game in which the value of x is observed with some noise and show that the derived selection rule differs from the HS's risk dominance. We apply CvD's idea to n-person generalized coordination game G(n, ) defined in Eq. (1). Notice that the n-person stag-hunt game studied by CvD is a special class of our game.
Nature draws θ, which determines the payoff matrix. Each player i receives a private signal θ i that provides an unbiased estimate of θ with some noise. After observing their own signals, players then choose either H or L. Payoffs are determined by the true game and the players' choices. Let be a one-dimensional random variable and let {E i } n i=1 be an n tuple of i.i.d. random variables, each having zero mean. The E i is independent of , with a continuous density and a support within [−1, 1]. For ε > 0, write
That ε = 0 implies that the true payoff realization θ is common knowledge. We are interested in what happens when ε is arbitrarily small, namely under almost common knowledge. Let P(θ) denote a 2n-dimensional payoff vector of a perturbed game, i.e.,
. We confine our attention to the perturbations that satisfy the following two conditions.
is continuous, monotonically increasing (resp. decreasing) in θ , and unbounded above and below; (b) the original unperturbed game G(n, ) obtains with θ = 0, i.e., P(0) = .
Let us defineθ
for a ∈ {H, L}. Assumption 1(a) above guarantees that θ andθ exist, and that −∞ < θ < 0 <θ < +∞. Clearly, if θ is greater thanθ and the value of θ is common knowledge among all players, strategy H is strictly dominant in a game with payoff matrix P(θ ). Similarly, if θ < θ, strategy L is strictly dominant. The next assumption guarantees that the possibility of each strategy being strictly dominant is real.
Assumption 2. The is uniformly distributed over an interval which contains [θ ,θ].
The realized value θ is almost common knowledge if ε is positive but tiny. Lack of common knowledge, together with A2, suggests applying an iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The next lemma shows that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium has the cutoff property and that the game considered here is indeed dominance solvable.
LEMMA 3. If A1 and A2 hold, then the equilibrium is characterized by cutoff θ G P such that player i optimally chooses H (resp. L) iff θ i > (resp. <) θ G P . Furthermore, θ G P is the unique root of the equation
Recall from A1(b) that the perturbed game corresponds to the original unperturbed game G(n, ) when θ = 0. We are interested in what happens at θ = 0 when the true payoff is almost common knowledge. Recall from Eq. (13) that |θ i | < ε if θ = 0. So if θ G P < (resp. >) 0, then θ i > θ G P for all i when θ = 0 and ε is sufficiently small; hence all players should optimally play H (resp. L) by Lemma 3. So we say that the equilibrium H in the unperturbed game is robust with respect to global perturbation if θ G P < 0, and that L is robust if θ G P > 0. Now the main result of this section follows.
then H is robust with respect to global perturbation. If the inequality is reversed, then L is robust.
Risk Dominance
We now turn to Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) notion of risk dominance. The definition of risk dominance is based on a hypothetical process of expectation formation starting from an initial situation, where it is common knowledge that either the equilibrium H or L must be the solution without knowing which one is the solution. Roughly speaking, the coordinated equilibrium H risk-dominates the other coordinated equilibrium L if the net gain from coordination with H is relatively larger than that with L. Net gain again is defined as the payoff from successful coordination minus the loss incurred when all the opponents collectively choose the other action. This implies that risk dominance measures "risk" from taking a particular action in a too extreme manner. Thus, the relevant threshold value is −φ 1 /(φ n −φ 1 ), where
Recall that the payoff difference function, defined in Eq. (2), is monotone increasing and satisfies (0) < 0 < (1). Hence, the equilibrium H risk-dominates L if and only if
We can easily check that Eq. (14) becomes linear in payoff matrix if n = 2, but it is nonlinear if n exceeds two. CvD (1993b) calculate the risk dominant equilibrium in n-person stag-hunt game, which is a special class of the game studied in this paper.
DISCUSSION
We summarize the dynamic selection criteria characterized in previous sections. Recall that is payoff matrix, is the payoff difference function defined in Eq. (2) and
In the game G(n, ), each model in parenthesis selects the equilibrium H if and only if ∈ satisfies the following condition:
[KMR]
We offer brief comments on how selection mechanisms differ. In KMR and FY, the constant flow of nonnegligible noises play a crucial role in selecting among strict equilibria. This allows the dynamical process to always restart. Hence, the resulting stochastic process is ergodic, which in turn implies that each state is eventually visited with probability one. What matters is how often the different states are visited over a long time period. Both papers show that the dynamic process assigns virtually all the probability to the risk-dominant equilibrium in two-by-two games. Exactly which equilibrium is selected depends crucially on details of noise distribution. In FY, it is the drift term depending on the payoff difference in Brownian motion that leads to the present result. In KMR, it is the state-independent rate of mutation that makes only sizes of basins of attraction relevant.
8 MM investigate equilibrium selection in two-by-two games, using an explicit adjustment process. They impose perfect foresight, and there is no mutation. The perfect-foresight restriction turns out to be sufficient to elicit a unique equilibrium, which is risk-dominant in two-by-two games. Now we elaborate on what makes three dynamic selections equivalent for two-by-two games but not for more general games. Recall that the state y ∈ Y denotes the population fraction choosing action H. Also recall that the payoff difference function, (y), is strictly increasing in y ∈ [0, 1], and that
. This immediately implies that a unique cutoff exists such that (y) = 0. Both MM and FY dynamics use weighted integrals of payoff difference along a potential path. To be more specific, in MM, Eq. (15) in the Appendix implies that there is a path from y = 0 (everyone chooses action L) to y = 1 (everyone chooses H) as people become increasingly patient if and only if the area below and above (y) is positive. In FY, the integrand is y(1 − y) (y), which is a symmetric sign-preserving transformation of (y). Hence, the system Eq. (10) stays almost surely in the neighborhood of y = 1 if and only if the area below and above y(1 − y) (y) is positive. On the other hand, in KMR, the threshold for different basins of attraction matters. More specifically, a unique long run equilibrium is y = 1 (everyone chooses H) if and only if (y) cuts the horizontal axis at a point less than a half. If (y) is linear in y, then the condition that the integral value of (y) is positive is equivalent to the condition that (y) cuts the horizontal axis at a point less than a half. If is not linear, there is no guarantee of equivalence. But if the underlying game is two-person game, is linear, but not if the game involves more than two players. Now we summarize the static selection criteria:
.
It is easy to check algebraically that, if n = 2, all five selection criteria are reduced to
This inequality is the well-known condition that the equilibrium H is riskdominant in two-by-two games. It is also immediate to show that, if n ≥ 3, all equivalences break, except that between the MM selection and the CvD selection. As a counterexample, let us take the stag-hunt game described in the Introduction, where n = 3 and κ = 3 (i.e., a three-person game under minimum rule). Applying the above formula to this game at hand, we can show that each approach selects the equilibrium L if and only if the payoff from action L, x, is larger than One may remark that the MM dynamic and the CvD global game approach generate the same selection criteria. We suspect that this equivalence also breaks if the uniformity assumption A2 is relaxed. Notice from Eq. (17) in the Appendix that the weight 1/n in the CvD formula emerges owing to the following reason: the probability that a certain number of opponents receive signals larger than my signal is independent of the exact location of my signal. But this property holds only when the distribution of true parameters is uniform. This paper may also have substantial implications with regard to recent experimental results by van Huyck et al. (1990 van Huyck et al. ( , 1991 . The experiments are as follows. Each treatment lasts for 10 stages. At the end of each treatment, subjects are paid the sum of their payoffs in the games they play. In each of the games, each player chooses among seven effort levels. In each stage, each player's payoff is determined by his own effort and a simple summary statistic. This statistic is either the minimum or median of group effort choices. The parameter values are given for the normal forms to be of coordination games with seven strict Paretoranked symmetric Nash equilibria. A large group consists of 14 to 16 players. One interesting result was that, in large group minimum treatments, subjects initially chose widely dispersed efforts and then rapidly approached the Pareto worst equilibrium. We claim that our results can capture this aspect. To this end, consider the stag hunt game in which n = 15 and κ = 15. Applying the selection formula to this game, then numerical calculations show that each approach selects the Pareto-dominant equilibrium H if and only if x is less than 0.0667 [MM and CvD] , 0.0001 [KMR], 0.0221 [FY] , and 0.134 [HS] , respectively. This implies that, unless x is extremely small, subjects' choices converge to the Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium.
MORE GENERAL GAMES
The class of games we look at is admittedly restrictive, since only binary choices are allowed. Extension to a class of games with more than two actions would be not only complicated, but the equilibrium selection would be often impossible due to the typical intransitivity among strict Nash equilibria. We study an interesting class of generalized pure coordination or simply "voting games," in which intransitivity does not arise. We define a voting game G(n, m; κ ), where n is the number of players, m is the number of choices, and the voting rule κ will be defined below. The payoff to the player action s = 1, 2, . . . , m is described as
where (s) denotes the total number of players choosing action s, and κ may be 2, . . . , n. Moreover, all coordinated equilibria are ordered, that is, 0 < a s ≤ a s , ∀s < s . The game G(n, m; κ ) possesses m pure strategy Pareto rankable Nash equilibria, where everyone chooses action s = 1, 2, . . . , m. It requires that both the voting rule (represented by κ) and the security (normalized to zero) be identical over all choices. The proof in the Appendix is lengthy, but the idea is intuitive. The previous sections suggest that Pareto efficiency is guaranteed when the number of actions is two; i.e., m = 2. With three or more actions, we apply the selection criterion in a pairwise way. The only case that we have to worry about is lack of transitivity, but this cannot occur in the class of games considered. The proposition implies that players eventually learn to play the efficient outcome in voting games. This observation is consistent with van Huyck et al.'s (1990) experimental results with pure coordination games, showing that actual subjects move swiftly to the Pareto best equilibrium effort level, regardless of group size.
CONCLUSION
We have generalized results on equilibrium selection in the direction of group size. However, the assumption of binary strategies is obviously restrictive. Effort is needed to generalize in encompassing multiactions. Pairwise comparisons may be a natural criterion, but we have to restrict the class of games, in order to preserve transitivity. As is shown in Section 6, a generalized pure coordination or voting game preserves such transitivity. On the other hand, it is easy to construct a game in which transitivity does not hold. Young (1993) analyzes a two-person three-action game where pairwise risk dominance fails but, nevertheless, a unique long run equilibrium exists. This fact suggests modification or refinement of riskdominance. Ellison (1994) characterizes KMR-style long run equilibria in twoperson multiaction games. More importantly, he shows that Morris, Rob, and Shin's (1995) refinement of risk-dominance, called 1 2 -dominance, is a sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be the unique long run equilibrium.
A more important research agenda will be to clarify the general relationship between the nature of the underlying dynamics and selected static equilibrium. Recent papers, such as Binmore, Samuelson, and Vaughan (1995) and Börgers and Sarin (1993) , attempt to address such an issue. Binmore et al. emphasize the importance of the order in which certain limits are taken and of the time span over which one desires to study the behavior of the selection model. Börgers and Sarin show that, in the continuous time limit, a version of a stochastic aspirationbased learning model coincides with the deterministic, continuous time replicator dynamics. We will have to await further research in these directions for answers.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that the pure strategy profile of exactly k players choosing H and (n − k) players choosing L is a Nash equilibrium. Then both π
which contradicts the definition of the set .
Characterization of the vector α and β. Equations (4) to (6) define the sets 0 , 1 , and 01 , where the element of the coefficient vectors α and β is
The following lemma characterizes the properties of the coefficient vectors.
LEMMA 4. For any n given, (a)
. . , 0, 1); and lim ρ→∞ β = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. (a) Via mathematical induction. Checking the case of n = 2 is trivial. Supposed that it holds for n − 1, i.e.,
The fact that n k=1 β k = 1 is trivial since the elements of the vector β are just a rearrangement of those of α. To check (b), (c), and (d) is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2. First of all, notice that
and that is strictly increasing, since
by the definition of the φ function and the non-decreasing property of the π k sequences.
The outcome H can be upset when players have an incentive to deviate for a feasible path from y = 1. Because of the monotonicity of , the incentive to deviate is the strongest if all players are anticipated to switch from H to L in the future, i.e., y t = e −λt . Hence, the condition for y = 1 being fragile is
which would be by the change-of-variable technique
Using Eq. (2), the definition and properties of the beta and gamma functions 10 and some algebraic manipulation, Eq. (15) becomes
which corresponds to the condition defining the 0 set. 10 Refer to any text on mathematical statistics.
We claim: y = 0 is globally accessible if and only if ∈ 0 . To prove the "if" part, it suffices to show that, if Eq. (16) holds, i.e., ∈ 0 , a feasible path from y = 1 to y = 0, y t = e −λt , satisfies the equilibrium condition, i.e., V t ≤ 0 ∀t along the path. This can be checked as follows:
To prove the "only if" part, it suffices to demonstrate that, if ∈ \ 0 , the equilibrium path is unique and converges to y = 1 for y 0 sufficiently close to 1. Reminding that any feasible path from y 0 satisfies y t ≥ y 0 e −λt , we get
Since the right-hand side is strictly positive at y 0 = 1 and continuous in y 0 , it is still positive for y 0 sufficiently close to 1. We also claim that y = 1 is absorbing if and only if ∈ \ 0 . To prove the "only if" part is exactly the same as to prove the "if" part of the statement that y = 0 is globally accessible iff ∈ 0 . Similarly, to prove the "if" part is exactly the same as to prove the "only if" part of the statement that y = 0 is globally accessible iff ∈ 0 .
Similarly, the condition for y = 0 being fragile combined with the change of variable technique will be
Again by the definition of function, the properties of gamma and beta functions and some algebraic manipulation, we have
which is the condition defining 1 . A symmetric argument as before shows that y = 1 is globally accessible if and only if ∈ 1 and that y = 0 is absorbing if and only if ∈ \ 1 . Combining all the facts shown yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (a) is clear from Lemma 2(b) and (c). As ρ → ∞, Lemma 2(d), together with Eq. (1) implies that both 0 and 1 converge to the empty set, while 01 converges to the whole set .
To prove Proposition 2, the following two lemmas are helpful. Proof. Differentiate N defined in Eq. (2) with respect to y, expand the resulting equation, and rearrange terms; then we have
Here the constant C is obtained from the exact expansion by replacing y and 1/N with 0's (resp. 1's) if the coefficient φ k is positive (resp. negative). Note that the first term of the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive, regardless of N . For any > 0, the second term C/N > − for N sufficiently large. Hence, (y) is increasing in y for N large enough. It is trivial to show that (0) < 0 < (1). Combining these facts yields the desired result.
LEMMA 6. For N sufficiently large and any Darwinian deterministic dynamic, the limit distribution for G(n, ) puts probability one on 1 if y * < 1 2
, or probability one on 0 when the inequality is reversed.
Proof. The same as that of KMR's Theorem 3; thus it is omitted. Proof of Proposition 3. The problem is min y∈ [0, 1] U (y), where the potential function U is defined in Eq. (11). We claim that this is equivalent to the following problem: to choose y = 0 if U(1) > 0, and choose y = 1 if U(1) < 0. Notice that −U (y) is the value of integral of the function x(1−x) (x) over [0, y] . Since is strictly increasing and (0) < 0 < (1), it is clear that −U (1) > −U(y) for any y ∈ [0, 1). Hence, if −U (0) > 0, the maximum −U (1) obtains at y = 1. On the other hand, if −U (0) < 0, the maximum −U (0) = 0 obtains at y = 0. But,
into the above expression and multiply both sides by six in order to make the weights sum to one.
Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that the existence and uniqueness of such θ G P are guaranteed by Assumption 1(a) and 1(c). As was suggested, we maintain the assumption that no player will choose strictly dominated strategies. Player i will certainly choose H if θ i >θ: Since the expected value is E( | θ ε i = θ i ) = θ i , player i knows that H is strictly dominant at each such observation.
Consider an observation θ i of player i slightly belowθ , such be that |θ − θ i | < 2ε. Player i knows that his opponent will play H if θ j >θ; hence, i's payoff if he chooses H at θ i is approximately 
Assumption 2 allows us to conclude that the probability in the Eq. (17) is independent of θ i , at least as long as θ i lies ε inside the support of . This observation allows us to conclude that this probability must be equal to the a priori probability that E i is the (k + 1)th smallest among the errors. Thus, Eq. (18) ensues, the less costly than this immediate jump. Note that we mutate individuals taking s into s, because any other mutation will only raise the transition cost more. Thus, the cost of transition C s s is the minimum integer x satisfying f (x) ≥ f (N − 1 − x)(a s /a s ).
It has a unique root, since Lemma 7 implies that the left-hand side of Eq. (22) is strictly increasing and so its right-hand side is strictly decreasing in x. Since a pure coordination game G(n, m; κ ) specifies 0 ≤ a 1 ≤ a 2 ≤ · · · ≤ a m , we can easily check that C s m < C s s ∀s < m, ∀s = s; C m,m−1 < C s ,m−1 ∀s < m − 1.
Therefore, the first step of the optimum branching algorithm as in KR, pages 407-410, is to choose a minimum cost outgoing branch from each state, which results in the system of branches (s → m), s = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1, and (m → m − 1). The longest branch among these is of length C m,m−1 . Therefore we drop it and are left with an m-tree. This completes the algorithm.
(3) FY. Due to Young's Theorem 2 and FY's Theorem 2, it is essentially the same as case (2) above; thus the proof is omitted.
